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Perhaps the majority felt that such an interpretation would
result in a greater divergence from the doctrine of forum non
conveniens than the wording of the section warrants. 27 Nonetheless,
at present, if section 1404(a) is to be available, the proposed transferee forum must be one over which the court has jurisdiction and
venue, and where the defendant was originalyamenable to process. 28
Any wider extension of the availability of transfers must now
depend upon clearer legislative pronouncement.

X
LABOR LAW -

INDUCEMENT

OF

SUPERVISOR PERMITTED

BY

AMENDED SECTION 8(b) (4).-A subcontractor without a union con-

tract was employed at two different construction sites. At the first
site, the general contractor operated under a union agreement requiring observance of union rules ' in all subcontracts. A superintendent at the site had full authority over these subcontracts, as well
as the authority to hire and fire, to hear grievances, and to handle
routine operational problems. The subcontractor employed suspended
union members and did not observe union conditions, which facts
were brought to the attention of the superintendent by an agent of
the union. The superintendent cancelled the subcontract. At the
second site, the subcontractor was removing dirt in trucks driven
by non-union personnel. Union officers told the contractors that
union drivers would not work with non-union drivers, and, as a
result, the subcontractor's non-union trucks were barred from the
in situations like the present implies distrust in the ability and character of
district judges to hold the balance . . . ." Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335,
368 (1960) (dissenting opinion to case No. 26, Sullivan v. Behimer).
27 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the Court had stated:
"In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play,
it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to
process. . . ." Id. at 506-07 (dictum). Considering the wording of the section and its admitted formulation "in accord" with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the light of this statement strengthens the majority view.
28 But see Continental Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 364 U.S. 19
(1960).
Here, a barge and its owner were libelled in admiralty. The Court
allowed transfer to a forum where the owner was originally amenable to
process, but where in rem jurisdiction over the barge was originally unavailable.
The Court reasoned, however, that this was really a single civil action against
the owner, although the barge was considered as a separate party through a
fiction of admiralty law. Thus compelling reasons of "convenience" and
"interest of justice" were allowed to override the fiction.
Mr. Justice
Whittaker, who wrote the majority opinion in the instant case, insisted, in
his dissenting opinion that the holding of the instant case should control.
I The union required employment of union members at the union pay scale.
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site. The United States District Court held that the statement of
the union agent at the first site was not a prohibited threat, but
merely a request for compliance with the union contract, nor was
it a prohibited inducement in view of the authority of the superintendent. However, the Court declared that the statements at the
second site constituted prohibited threats within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (4) (ii) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 188 F. Supp. 558
(D. Mass. 1960).
Union unfair labor practices were first defined in 1947 by the
Taft-Hartley Act.2 Though not specifically mentioning the secondary
boycott, Congress nevertheless sought to outlaw it.' The act made
it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce "the employees of
any employer" to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal to work,
where the object was to cause a neutral employer to cease doing
business with another person. 4 Subsequent decisions, however, exposed weaknesses in three areas of the provision. First, the language
apparently permitted a union to induce an individual worker.
Second, the act's definitions of "employer" 6 and "employee" 7 specifically excluded certain persons from its coverage. Thus, the secondary boycott provision did not apply to employees of railroads 8
and political subdivisions, 9 nor to supervisors 10 as a class. Finally,
2

Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)

(1958).

3 "This

provision [§ 8(b) (4)] makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary

boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in
the disagreement between an employer and his employees." 93 CoNG. REc.
4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
4Specifically, §8(b)(4) made it an unfair labor practice for a union
"to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person ....
"
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (1958).
5 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
6 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935), as amended,
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1958).
7 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935), as amended,
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1958).
8 Seafarers' Union, 124 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (1959); Lumber and Sawmill
Workers, Local 2409, 126 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1959); Paper Markets Importing
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956).
Contra, W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. NLRB,
246 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1957), reversing 116 N.L.R.B. 1756 (1956).
9 Paper Makers Importing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 104 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1953).
10 See L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 163 F.2d 905 (D.C.
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the neutral employer himself received no protection from direct union
pressures."The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 12
included amendments to section 8(b) (4) which were designed to
correct these weaknesses. The amended provision made it an unfair
labor practice for a union
(i)

to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any

person engaged in commerce ... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to
perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . .13
14
where an object thereof was to effect a secondary boycott.
The instant case involves one of the first definitive interpretations of the amended section. In permitting the union conduct at
the first site, the Court seemingly based its decision on the broad
authority vested in the superintendent. In the words of the Court,
he "had authority to hire and fire, to hear grievances, and to handle

routine operational

problems arising out of subcontracts." 1'

In

addition, he could "terminate" such contracts. The Court therefore
held that the mere mention to the superintendent of the fact that his
employer's union contract required observance of union rules in all

subcontracts could not be a threat prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (ii).
Nor did the Court hold that such conduct was a prohibited induce-

ment under section 8(b) (4) (i), since it interpreted that section as
applying to persons performing manual or clerical services, or "minor

supervisory functions," and not to persons with authority to sever
business relations.
Concerning the activity at the second site, the
Court stated summarily that the remarks of the union officers
amounted to threats and were prohibited by section 8(b) (4) (ii).
It was generally thought that substitution of the term "individual"
for the term "employees" would bring supervisors, as a class, within
the coverage of section 8(b) (4) (i),16 since the only apparent basis

Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Foreman's Ass'n v. L. A. Young Spring & Wire
Corp., 333 U.S. 837 (1947).
11 Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 911, 912 (2d Cir. 1952) ; accord, NLRB
v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 226 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1955).
12 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1959).
13 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519, 542-43
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1959).
forcing or requiring any
14 Specifically, the prohibited objective is "(B)
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person . . . !' Labor-Management Reporting
and Discfosure Act, 73 Stat. 519, 543, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (Supp.
1959).
15 NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 188 F. Supp. 558, 560 (D. Mass. 1960).
16 Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclomre Act of 1959,
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for the exclusion of supervisors was the act's definition of the term
"employee." 17 In 1947 Congress first defined a "supervisor" for the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such azthority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requireg the use of independent judgmentj 8
Prior to this definition the NLRB had consistently distinguished
persons with genuine management authority from other minor supervisory employees. The former were labeled "supervisors" and excluded from the act's coverage,' 9 while the latter were consistently
included as "employees." 20 Congress recognized and retained this
classification when it specifically defined a "supervisor" for the act's
purposes,21 and subsequent NLRB decisions have fortified this distinction.22 It is true that these classifications were made in connection
with the application of sections of the act containing the term
"employee." Nevertheless, the practical effect of this Court's limitation of the applicability of section 8(b) (4) (i) to persons with "minor
supervisory functions" would seem to be the equation of the terms
"individual" and "employee," at least with respect to supervisors.
Job-titles per se have never been conclusive proof of supervisory
status.23 In applying sections of the National Labor Relations Act

73 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1113-114 (1959); Ryan, Secondary Boycotts Under
the New Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 34 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 42, 44 (1959).

'1 See note 11 supra.
1s Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, 138
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1958) (emphasis added).
19 Matter of Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 59 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1163 (1944)
(authority to hire, fire and discipline other employees); Casper Lumber Co.,
55 N.L.R.B. 819, 821 (1944) (authority to hire and fire).
20 Endicott Johnson Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 1342, 1347 (1946) (authority to
keep production moving); Pittsburgh Equitable Meter Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 880,
882 (1945) (authority to give instructions and to lay out work).
21 S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). "[T]he committee has
not been unmindful of the fact that certain employees with minor supervisory
duties have problems which may justify their inclusion in that Act [NLRA].
It has therefore distinguished between straw bosses, lead men, set-up men,
and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor
vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire,
discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such acts. In
other words, the committee has adopted the test which the Board itself has
made
22 in numerous cases . ..

."

Ibid.

United States Gypsum Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 20, 25 (1957); Southern
Bleachery & Print Works, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 787, 791 (1956).
23N LRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 235, 239
(4th Cir. 1958); Red Star Express Lines of Auburn, Inc. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d
78 (2d Cir. 1952).
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with the term "employee," the courts and the NLRB have excluded
those supervisory personnel whose functions identified them closely
with management. It is submitted that section 8(b) (4) (i) was
designed primarily to bring those "employees," excluded under the
old section, within the ambit of the secondary boycott provisions.
However, nowhere does it appear that Congress intended to abolish
Hence,
the distinction between "supervisors" and "employees."
section 8(b) (4) (i) has properly been interpreted as excluding persons with management-like authority, since such authority justifies
their treatment as "agents" of the neutral employer, rather than as
employees.

X
SALES-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-PRIVITY UNNECES-

FOR RECOVERY.-Plaintiff husband bought an automobile from
defendant dealer which had been manufactured by defendant Chrysler
Corporation. The dealer-manufacturer warranty disclaimed all warranties except the replacement of parts.' Ten days after purchase,
plaintiff wife received injuries in an automobile accident when the
car went out of control due to a defective steering mechanism.2
Plaintiff wife and plaintiff husband brought a breach of warranty action against both dealer and manufacturer. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the wife could recover for personal injuries,
and the husband, for loss of services, against both dealer and manufacturer regardless of privity. The Court further stated that the
dealer-manufacturer warranty disclaimer was invalid as a matter of
public policy. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960).
In 1890 the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that "a
SARY

sound public policy .

..

demands that the doctrine of caveat emptor

shall be still further encroached upon, rather than that the public
health shall be endangered." 3 Some years later, when an eminent
' The warranty expressly guaranteed the replacement of parts for 90 days
or 4,000 miles, whichever occurred first. It expressly disclaimed all other
warranties.
2 The car was demolished in the accident, making it impossible to discover where the defect had occurred. The only substantial evidence of a
defect, aside from the wife's testimony that the car went completely out of
control, was an opinion by the insurance inspector that there must have been
some mechanical defect to cause the car to react the way it did. Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 75 (1960).
3 Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, 118 N.Y. 260, 267, 23 N.E. 372, 374
(1890).

